Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144983 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5948
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We demonstrate that the notion of a “family constitution” (self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family norm) requiring adults to provide attention for elderly parents carries over from a world where sexually indifferentiated individuals reproduce by cell separation, to one where individuals differentiated by sex marry, have children and bargain over the allocation of domestic resources on condition that individual preferences are transmitted from parents to children, and having the same preferences is a criterion for marrying. We also show that policies are generally nonneutral (even if the individuals concerned are altruistically linked to one another) and affect the share of the adult population that are governed by family constitutions.
Schlagwörter: 
marriage
family constitution
preference transmission
policy neutrality
JEL: 
D10
I20
I30
J10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
218.97 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.