Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141859
Authors: 
Belleflamme, Paul
Toulemonde, Eric
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5882
Abstract: 
We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax affects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase may end up increasing the profit of the taxed platform (lucky break) or, conversely, reducing it twice (double jeopardy).
Subjects: 
two-sided platforms
taxation
pass-through
JEL: 
D43
L13
L86
O32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.