Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129820 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-02
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.
Schlagwörter: 
social norms
norm elicitation
order effects
within-subject design
corruption
bribe game
JEL: 
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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