Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129282
Authors: 
Fochmann, Martin
Jahnke, Bjoern
Wagener, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Leibniz University of Hannover 570
Abstract: 
Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that 'the system' had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that only learned that the attempt did not affect their payoffs or that were not at all exposed to corruption.
Subjects: 
public goods
experiment
institutions
JEL: 
H41
A13
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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