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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) No. 570
Verlag: 
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Hannover
Zusammenfassung: 
Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that 'the system' had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that only learned that the attempt did not affect their payoffs or that were not at all exposed to corruption.
Schlagwörter: 
public goods
experiment
institutions
JEL: 
H41
A13
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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