Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128394
Authors: 
Mason, Charles F.
Polasky, Stephen
Tarui, Nori
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5698
Abstract: 
We model countries’ choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international institutions capable of enforcing environmental agreements on sovereign nations, we analyze self-enforcing climate-change treaties that are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. In simulations based on current conditions, we explore the structure of a selfenforcing agreement that achieves efficient climate change policy.
Subjects: 
international agreements
climate change
differential games
JEL: 
Q54
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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