Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127320
Authors: 
Schnedler, Wendelin
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 505
Abstract: 
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identifi cation problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identifi cation problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a wide-spread type of multi-tasking problem.
Subjects: 
moral hazard
hidden action
implementation
multi-tasking
identification by organization design
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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