Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127320 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 505
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identifi cation problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identifi cation problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a wide-spread type of multi-tasking problem.
Schlagwörter: 
moral hazard
hidden action
implementation
multi-tasking
identification by organization design
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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