Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123467
Authors: 
Häfner, Samuel
Nöldeke, Georg
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Discussion Paper 2014/11
Abstract: 
In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff shares arise as the outcome of the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the answer is shown to be positive.
Subjects: 
Contests
Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
Rent-Dissipation
JEL: 
C72
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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