Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123434 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Discussion Paper No. 2012/01
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Senior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity and their number has grown enormously since World War II. We study the growth in employment of this politically sensitive high-profile occupational group from a political economics perspective. We analyze how political partisanship, political patronage after changes in government, and the selection of public servants into politics affect senior official employment. Based on a unique time-series, cross-sectional data set for the German Laender, we find mixed evidence for the effect that the political selection of public servants has on senior official employment. We find some evidence for political patronage.
Schlagwörter: 
political selection
public servants
public-sector growth
bureaucracy
patronage
JEL: 
D72
D73
H11
H72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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