Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123150
Authors: 
Rothenhäusler, Dominik
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5525
Abstract: 
Many tasks can only be completed if several people contribute. Likewise, many institutions, e.g. voting rules, require the support of several people to implement specific decisions. In such situations, individual costs from supporting may decrease in the number of supporters. This holds true for physical costs in division of labor. Psychological, sociological and economic evidence suggests that also moral costs due to feelings of guilt or having a bad conscience diffuse. This paper analyzes the influence of diffusion of costs in threshold public good games under incomplete information, and compares predictions to those when costs do not diffuse.
Subjects: 
moral decision making
division of labor
shared guilt
diffusion of responsibility
institutions and morals
committee decisions
moral transgression
JEL: 
D02
D03
D23
D63
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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