Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120981
Authors: 
Dutcher, E. Glenn
Balafoutas, Loukas
Lindner, Florian
Ryvkin, Dmitry
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9330
Abstract: 
We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top.
Subjects: 
tournament
winner
loser
contract
experiment
learning
JEL: 
M52
J33
J24
D24
C90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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