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Autoren: 
Dutcher, E. Glenn
Balafoutas, Loukas
Lindner, Florian
Ryvkin, Dmitry
Sutter, Matthias
Datum: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9330
Zusammenfassung: 
We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top.
Schlagwörter: 
tournament
winner
loser
contract
experiment
learning
JEL: 
M52
J33
J24
D24
C90
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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