Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119694 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 87.2002
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider environmental risks that are evaluated too much heavy for a single insurance company, but they can be insured by n companies which a premium is assigned to.This is precisely the Italian scenario where a pool of companies co-insures these risks.Under a game theoretic approach we start by analyzing how they should split the risk and the premium in order to be better off. Under suitable hypotheses, there exists an optimal decomposition of the risk, that allow us to define a cooperative game whose properties and some particular solutions are analysed.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental risk
Cooperative game
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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