Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118035
Authors: 
Caparrós, Alejandro
Pereau, Jean-Christophe
Tazdaït, Tarik
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 9.2003
Abstract: 
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.
Subjects: 
Bargaining theory
asymmetric information
climate change
international cooperation
JEL: 
C78
D74
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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