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Autoren: 
Caparrós, Alejandro
Pereau, Jean-Christophe
Tazdaït, Tarik
Datum: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 9.2003
Zusammenfassung: 
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining theory
asymmetric information
climate change
international cooperation
JEL: 
C78
D74
H77
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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