Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113778
Autoren: 
Cubitt, Robin P.
Gaechter, Simon
Quercia, Simone
Datum: 
2015
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5444
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited.
Schlagwörter: 
public goods game
conditional cooperation
trust
betrayal aversion
exploitation aversion
free riding
experiments
JEL: 
H41
C91
C72
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
695.46 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.