Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111213 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 157
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We design a laboratory experiment to identify causal performance effects of top-down communication between managers and their subordinates. Our focus lies on communication that resolves uncertainty about the work environment but does not provide task-specific knowledge. Recent articles in the business press report a lack of such communication in real-world organizations and associate it with reduced organizational performance. Our results confirm this observation. We find that top-down communication is a profitable way for managers to increase employee performance in the presence of uncertainty. Specifically, we show that non-communication is the worst option for managers. However, 50 percent of our experimental managers use top-down communication too restrictively. Overall, managers forego 30 percent of their potential profits through non-communication. We show that organizations can overcome this problem by adopting automated information procedures, which are equally effective.
Schlagwörter: 
communication procedures
non-instrumental-information
employee motivation
JEL: 
C92
D23
D83
M54
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
294.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.