Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109950
Authors: 
Doerrenberg, Philipp
Schmitz, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 15-028
Abstract: 
We study tax compliance in Slovenia using data generated in a field experiment. Small accounting companies were randomly assigned to an untreated control group and two treatment groups. Companies in the first treatment group received a letter that highlighted the importance of paying taxes and informed about the likelihood of becoming subject to an audit. In the second treatment group, tax officers from the tax authorities handed out in person the same letter that companies in the first treatment group received by post. The results indicate that such letters can increase compliance, and trigger even more compliance if handed over in person. These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions that we derive to rationalize the experiment.
Subjects: 
Tax Compliance
Audits
Randomized Field Experiment
Tax authority
Information provision
JEL: 
H20
H32
H50
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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