Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107798
Authors: 
Lazarova, Emiliya
Borm, Peter
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-086/II
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.
Subjects: 
matching
Pareto optimal matching
contractually exchange stability
compensation stability
compensation schedule
JEL: 
C78
C71
D60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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