Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107489
Authors: 
Bütler, Monika
Deuchert, Eva
Lechner, Michael
Staubli, Stefan
Thiemann, Petra
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8715
Abstract: 
Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for low DI outflow. We analyse a conditional cash program that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. 4,000 randomly selected DI recipients receive an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they expand work hours and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the program announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest; individuals at cash-cliffs react more frequently. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate amounts to only 0.5%.
Subjects: 
disability insurance
field experiment
financial incentive
return-to-work
JEL: 
H55
J14
C93
D04
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
520.22 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.