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Autor:innen: 
Bütler, Monika
Deuchert, Eva
Lechner, Michael
Staubli, Stefan
Thiemann, Petra
Datum: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8715
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for low DI outflow. We analyse a conditional cash program that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. 4,000 randomly selected DI recipients receive an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they expand work hours and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the program announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest; individuals at cash-cliffs react more frequently. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate amounts to only 0.5%.
Schlagwörter: 
disability insurance
field experiment
financial incentive
return-to-work
JEL: 
H55
J14
C93
D04
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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