Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107132
Authors: 
Kesten, Onur
Kurino, Morimitsu
Nesterov, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2015-203
Abstract: 
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.
Subjects: 
lottery
ex post efficiency
sd-efficiency
random serial dictatorship
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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