Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105144
Authors: 
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5089
Abstract: 
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the information available about rules. Each player can only observe which class, out of a collection of classes smaller than the number of rules, the opponent's rule belongs to. For any underlying 2-player, finite, normal-form game there is a game extended with coarsely observable strategies that has equilibria with payoffs arbitrarily close to any feasible, individually rational payoff profile.
Subjects: 
cooperation
reciprocity
transparency
commitment
contract
JEL: 
C72
C78
D74
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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