Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104218
Authors: 
Gallice, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2007-5
Abstract: 
The paper enriches a standard signaling model of education with issues of social distance defined over educational achievements. More specifically it considers the effects that the presence of conformist and status seeking individuals has on educational dynamics. Under very reasonable assumptions about the composition of the society, the model endogenously displays a growing average level of schooling. As education rises, signals get noisy and potentially harmful for what concerns firms' profitability. Firms, in order to adjust their screening process, react with an increase of their educational requirements. All these dynamics are in line with recent trends and other stylized facts about education.
Subjects: 
education
signaling
status seeking
conformist behaviour.
JEL: 
I20
D70
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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