Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104218 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2007-5
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper enriches a standard signaling model of education with issues of social distance defined over educational achievements. More specifically it considers the effects that the presence of conformist and status seeking individuals has on educational dynamics. Under very reasonable assumptions about the composition of the society, the model endogenously displays a growing average level of schooling. As education rises, signals get noisy and potentially harmful for what concerns firms' profitability. Firms, in order to adjust their screening process, react with an increase of their educational requirements. All these dynamics are in line with recent trends and other stylized facts about education.
Schlagwörter: 
education
signaling
status seeking
conformist behaviour.
JEL: 
I20
D70
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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