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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 13-11
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.
Schlagwörter: 
directed search
selection
wage posting
JEL: 
D83
J21
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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