Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103138
Authors: 
Christofzik, Désirée
Kessing, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5023
Abstract: 
A gradually introduced reform of local government accounting made it temporarily likely for municipalities in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia to avoid the effective control of their budget by the authorities in charge with overseeing local government budgets and enforcing the existing fiscal rules. Using this arguably exogenous withdrawal of effective fiscal oversight we identify the effects of fiscal restraints and their enforcement on fiscal outcomes. We find that the withdrawal of oversight has a significant and sizeable effect on per capita debt of local governments that were previously constrained by fiscal oversight. Fiscal restraints are important, and oversight and enforcement are key issues for their success.
Subjects: 
fiscal oversight
fiscal rules
local government debt
JEL: 
H72
H74
R10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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