Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102598 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1997-27
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes a general-equilibrium model in which each person can choose to be either a producer or a predator. This model shows how predation breaks the link between the interpersonal distribution of productive resources and the interpersonal distribution of consumption. SpeciÞcally, we Þnd that in this model the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the expected consumption of the least advantaged person selects an unegalitarian distribution of productive resources in which a positive fraction of people have only the minimum possible endowment of productive resources. Also, an egalitarian distribution of productive resources is not even Pareto efficient.
JEL: 
D31
D50
D60
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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