Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101874
Authors: 
Lester, Benjamin R.
Visschers, Ludo
Wolthoff, Ronald P.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8357
Abstract: 
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call "invariance," and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.
Subjects: 
search frictions
matching function
meeting technology
competing mechanisms
JEL: 
C78
D44
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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