Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101874 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8357
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call "invariance," and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.
Schlagwörter: 
search frictions
matching function
meeting technology
competing mechanisms
JEL: 
C78
D44
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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