Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101651
Authors: 
Goerke, Laszlo
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 357
Abstract: 
For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.
Subjects: 
Private Information
Joint Bargaining
Strike Activity
JEL: 
C78
D82
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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