Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100517
Authors: 
Basteck, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Game Theory and Welfare Economics B12-V3
Abstract: 
We study the problem of assigning indivisible goods to individuals where each is to receive one object. To guarantee fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments and analyse various equity criteria for such lotteries. In particular, we find that sd-no-envy (as championed by the Probabilistic Serial) is incompatible with the sd-core from equal division. As an alternative, we present a Walrasian mechanism, whose outcomes are sd-efficient, group sd-envy-free, lie in the sd-core from equal division and satisfy the sd-equal-division-lower-bound.
JEL: 
C70
D63
D50
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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