Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100138
Authors: 
Dahm, Matthias
Esteve, Patricia
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2014-08
Abstract: 
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition.
Subjects: 
asymmetric contest
equality of opportunity
affirmative action
discrimination
prize structure
exclusion principle
JEL: 
C72
D72
I38
J78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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