Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100062 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 14-043
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.
Subjects: 
Competition policy
cartels
leniency
European Union
JEL: 
L41
K21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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