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Title:Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction PDF Logo
Authors:Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo Working Paper: Industrial Organisation 3983
Abstract:Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.
Subjects:combinatorial clock auction
JEL:D44
L96
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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