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Title:Permanent and selective capital account management regimes as an alternative to self-insurance strategies in emerging-market economies PDF Logo
Authors:Bibow, Jörg
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Working paper, Levy Economics Institute 683
Abstract:Currency market intervention-cum-reserve accumulation has emerged as the favored selfinsurance strategy in recipient countries of excessive private capital inflows. This paper argues that capital account management represents a less costly alternative line of defense deserving renewed consideration, especially in the absence of fundamental reform of the global monetary and financial order. Mainstream arguments in favor of financial globalization are found unconvincing; any indirect benefits allegedly obtainable through hot money inflows are equally obtainable without actually tolerating such inflows. The paper investigates the experiences of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) in the global crisis and subsequent recovery, focusing on their respective policies regarding capital flows.
Subjects:capital flows
self-insurance
capital controls
financial regulation
JEL:F02
F32
F33
F39
G28
O23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

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