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Title:Lying and team incentives PDF Logo
Authors:Conrads, Julian
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5968
Abstract:We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.
Subjects:compensation schemes
lying
team
experiment
JEL:C91
C92
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-201110102151
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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