Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55002
Authors: 
Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
Schubert, Manuel
Giamattei, Marcus
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-63-11
Abstract: 
We carry out an experiment on a macroeconomic price setting game where prices are complements. Despite relevant information being common knowledge and price flexibility we observe significant deviation from equilibrium prices and history dependence. In a first treatment we observe that equilibrium values were obtained in the long run but at the cost of a very slow adjustment and thus history dependence. By reporting a business indicator in a simpler form, subjects were given the chance to coordinate their prices by help of a heuristic in a second treatment. This option was widely taken, bringing about excess volatility and a deviation from equilibrium even in the long run. In a third treatment with staggered pricing we observe, contrary to theoretical predictions, the one-round ahead (publicly known) shock is significant, but future inflation is not. Our findings cast light on price dynamics when subjects have limited computational capacities.
Subjects: 
Inflation Persistence
Staggered Prices
Sticky Reasoning
New Keynesian Phillips Curve
JEL: 
E31
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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