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On the role of heuristics: Experimental evidence on inflation dynamics

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On the Role of Heuristics – Experimental Evidence on Inflation Dynamics

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Abstract

We carry out an experiment on a macroeconomic price setting game where prices are complements. Despite relevant information being common knowledge and price flexibility we observe significant deviation from equilibrium prices and history dependence. In a first treatment we observe that equilibrium values were obtained in the long run but at the cost of a very slow adjustment and thus history dependence. By reporting a business indicator in a simpler form, subjects were given the chance to coordinate their prices by help of a heuristic in a second treatment. This option was widely taken, bringing about excess volatility and a deviation from equilibrium even in the long run. In a third treatment with staggered pricing we observe, contrary to theoretical predictions, the one-round ahead (publicly known) shock is significant, but future inflation is not. Our findings cast light on price dynamics when subjects have limited computational capacities.

JEL Classification: E31, C92

Keywords: Inflation Persistence, Staggered Prices, Sticky Reasoning, New Keynesian Phillips Curve.

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1 Introduction

What drives inflation dynamics? Are subjects completely rational or is there some mental inertia? Would cognitive limitations hinder rationality and may this bring about inflation persistence? We carry out an experiment where prices are flexible and information common knowledge. Information arrives undisturbed by other pieces of information that might otherwise absorb attention. The experiment is sufficiently simple such that not only the mathematically sophisticated will be capable of finding equilibrium prices. Although standard economic reasons for inflation persistence have been deleted we nonetheless observe that errors persist and carry over from one round to another. Prices are partly inherited.

In addition to player's abstention from optimizing behavior our results are novel in four respects. First, we observe that players prefer to follow a heuristic where this is offered. Without a heuristic the adjustment is particularly slow, errors persist longer and history is more important in shaping current prices. When a heuristic can be followed, this serves as a focal point to coordinate prices and is chosen although it generates excess short-run variation across time. Second, the heuristic has the power to divert prices away from their equilibrium value even in the long run. Third, contrary to Akerlof et al. (2000) we observe that the heuristic does not bias prices towards the status quo. Fourth, the heuristic diverts players away from recognizing future inflation as a determinant for current prices.

Our findings are important in various ways. They allow reconciling theoretical predictions with empirical findings. Models with sticky prices predict that expected future inflation is important in determining current levels of inflation. In contrast to this, empirically the most important drivers for current levels of inflation are past levels of inflation. Our experiment may contribute to explaining this finding. A variety of policy conclusions is at hand, which will be discussed in the concluding section.

2 Previous Theoretical Research

How monetary policy may bring about not only nominal but also real effects is one of the most widely debated issues in economics. It has become standard to assume that anticipated policy shifts affect prices only without impacting output, (Lucas 1996). Real effects arise only temporarily in case of unanticipated shocks, when price adjustments remain incomplete. Research has then focused on identifying reasons for such a short-run incompleteness of price adjustments. Early writers have tried to trace this to adaptive forecasting rules where history shapes at least some of the prices in an economy. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) make the point that only few adaptive players would be needed to produce substantial frictions in the adjustment of prices. But overall, assumptions regarding adaptive expectations, resting on the failure of economic agents to draw rational inferences from publicly known data, did not find widespread support. The standard approach has been to look for objective factors for incomplete price adjustments, rather than limits to rationality.

One avenue has been provided by sticky-price models, where price adjustments are either costly or temporarily impeded. Even if only a small fraction of agents faces such restrictions, the aggregate impact could be large. This is due to prices being strategic complements, (Ball and Romer 1990). Even those who are able to adjust their price will do so only cautiously, as they observe others whose price remains fixed. Sticky price models have thus been regarded a key to understand inflation dynamics. Taylor (1980) proposed a model with staggered pricing where price setters alternate in their capacity to adjust prices. Calvo (1983) suggested that

agents are randomly allowed to adjust prices, this capacity arriving subject to a Poisson-process. These approaches have been observed to imply that current levels of inflation depend on expectations of future inflation. Agents who can adjust prices today will form expectations about future inflation. They seek to optimize their price level not only with respect to the current but also to subsequent rounds when they are impeded from adjusting their price. The resulting equation for inflation dynamics is known as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, NKPC, (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999; Woodford 2003; Romer 2006: 309). A standard version is $\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \gamma y_t$, with π_t being inflation in period t, $E_t \pi_{t+1}$ being expected inflation formed in period t with respect to period t+1, and y the output gap.

From a theoretical perspective the NKPC produced some unease. Romer (2006: 332) notes that in response to a boom (the output gap y being positive), expected future inflation, $E_t \pi_{t+1}$, must be smaller than current inflation, π_t. This runs counter to intuition as a boom is commonly linked to fears of increasing inflation. Also empirically the evidence on the NKPC is rather mixed. While future levels of inflation are commonly found to be significant, also past levels of inflation obtain a noteworthy impact, (Fuhrer 2006; Álvarez et al. 2006). Backward looking behavior, not only forward looking optimization, can be observed in most data. This deficiency has been addressed by some theoretical models, alas as criticized by Angeloni et al. (2006) in a rather ad hoc fashion: By the inclusion of automatic indexation for some fraction of the prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005) or by adding some backward looking players to the population (Galí and Gertler 1999). These models involved some limits on rationality in order to ameliorate theory with evidence.

Another approach to explain inflation persistence rests on the idea of sticky information. Such approaches go back to Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1973). Mankiw and Reis (2002) introduce sluggish information transition in a model of monopolistic competition. They allow price setters to adjust prices at any time, but a Poisson process determines the arrival of new information. Information about shocks thus does not become common knowledge immediately. Some firms continue to set prices based on outdated information. Past expectations of current economic conditions become relevant to current behavior and account for the sluggishness of adjustments. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) go one step further and argue that price setters face a trade-off between paying attention to aggregate conditions and paying attention to idiosyncratic conditions. They regard these cognitive constraints, rather than information being unavailable, as being better capable of explaining inflation dynamics. Nominal aggregate shocks thus exert real influence because firms are cognitively occupied with firm-specific information. Only when aggregate shocks are sufficiently large would they be able to attract aggregate attention and exert a more substantial impact. Sticky information in their view is the result of rational inattention.

This idea can already be traced back to the work by Akerlof et al. (2000). The authors argue that agents will depart from optimizing behavior and use simplified abstractions instead. Referring to the work of psychologists, they argue that decisions are based on heuristics instead, which remain in use as long as the resulting mistakes are not too severe. The authors assume a tendency to ignore signals that imply low levels of inflation. Players confronted with such signals will disregard them and thus fail to adjust their prices accordingly. The heuristic would thus be to keep prices constant unless information goes beyond a certain threshold.

Our study reveals some similarity. We observe that players use past levels of prices to function as a starting point for setting current prices. But we posit that it is not inattention that

drives agents and it is not price stability that operates as a heuristic. Players are instead observed to make use of a signal that, in our study, generates excess variation of prices across time and drives prices away from their equilibrium level even in the long run. Lack of a heuristic, to the contrary, does not motivate players to more thoroughly optimize and thus approach the equilibrium quicker. We rather observe an even more sluggish adjustment towards equilibrium where a heuristic is not offered.

3 Previous Experimental Evidence

Laboratory macroeconomic experiments have gained prominence lately, as evidenced in the comprehensive survey by Duffy (2008). Simon (1957) was among the first to posit that rationality imposes strong informational and computational requirements upon individual behavior, suggesting that simple rules of thumb may be used instead. The importance of heuristics and how they bring about deviations from rationality were proven by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman (2003). There exists a rich literature that applies these insights to asset markets. There are few investigations, however, on the link between heuristics and the pricing of commodities. Such commodities differ from assets because they are produced and consumed in the same period, they are not stored and thus varying prices exert no direct impact on the wealth.

Most experiments on commodity pricing operate with limited information. They link individual prices or price forecast with that of other players to determine individual payoffs by help of a pricing function. But this pricing function is not common knowledge, subjects know little about it. They are only given feedback with respect to past prices, forecast and realizations. Two variants of such experiments can be found. In the first variant there exists a positive relationship between price forecasts. If a single expectation on prices rises, the aggregate market price rises as well, giving reason to others to adjust their forecast upward. Price forecasts are thus strategic complements. The opposite is the case for negative expectations feedback and, thus, prices being substitutes. The main challenge in these experiments is to learn to forecast correctly. These experiments have thus been labeled Learning to Forecast Experiments (LtFEs), (Hommes 2011). At the core of these experiments lies the question of whether equilibria can be approached by help of adaptive learning. Are rational expectations equilibria learnable?

One such experiment, Hommes et al. (2007), investigates price forecasting in a simple Cobweb-model. Six subjects operate for 50 rounds and are asked to forecast the current round's price level from the interval [0, 10]. These forecasts are used to determine the quantity jointly supplied by the six subjects and the realized price that is required to equilibrate demand with this level of supply. Price forecasts are substitutes in this setting: If a subject forecasts an excessively high price she will boost supply, which lowers the realized price. A rational reaction by other subjects would be to reduce their forecast. Hommes et al. (2007) confront players with a stationary shock that impacts demand. Individual payoffs are linearly decreasing with the quadratic difference between their price forecast and its realization. Three different treatments are investigated where naïve expectations imply price variation to be strongly unstable, unstable or stable. The authors do not find autocorrelation in any of the treatments, which leads the authors to argue that naïve expectations that might be exploited by others were not obtained. But variance was lower in the stable treatment, suggesting that expectations were not completely rational. As pointed out by Duffy (2008), this may also be related to the limited information subjects had regarding how the model generated the data. Since the type of feedback is the main informational content in these

experiments with limited information, Heemeijer et al. (2009) test the different speed in convergence to equilibrium in experiments with substitutes and complements. They employ pricing functions which are similar to the one used here and the one by Sutan and Willinger (2009), where prices are determined by a function of the average guesses. In Heemeijer et al. (2009) prices exhibit some perturbance by white noise shocks. Again the pricing function is not common knowledge. Heemeijer et al. (2009) show that convergence is faster with substitutes than with complements.

Another branch of experimental research, which acts under limited information as well, deals with inflation forecasting in complex New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models. These approaches reveal some similarity to price forecasting games as they build on a similar mechanism, but this time assume forecasts being complements. The most prominent example is Adam (2007). He tests whether subjects can correctly predict levels of inflation that are given by a New Keynesian model and includes a NKPC. Five subjects were grouped together and supposed to predict inflation with payoffs increasing in the accuracy of their prediction. Past levels of inflation and output were reported to them. Their predictions were taken as an input to the model to determine the respective realized level of inflation. While subjects did not know the (complex) model, they might have been assumed to learn its dynamics after some repetition, thus being able to form rational expectations. As noted by Duffy (2008), players are supposed to behave somewhat like econometricians, using possibly misspecified forecasting rules which they update in real-time as new observations become available. But players fail in achieving rational outcomes. Adam (2007) observes a deviation from rational expectations, which contributes to the persistence of output and inflation.

A similar focus on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve can be found in the studies by Pfafjar and Zakelj (2009) and Assenza et al. (2011), embedded into a complex model whose quantitative specification is not revealed not subjects. Assenza et al. (2011) employ subjects as professional forecasters whose must guess the two round ahead level of inflation that can be derived from a three-equation New Keynesian model on output, inflation and the interest rate, embracing a demand function, a monetary policy rule and the NKPC. They find that subjects employ simple forecasting heuristics for determining future inflation. Pfafjar and Zakelj (2009) put their focus of different monetary policy settings to find out how inflation targeting, inflation forecast targeting or a Taylor-rule impact forecasting and thus the stability of inflation.

Other experiments provide players with complete information. Fehr and Tyran (2001) gather experimental evidence on money illusion. They ask their participants to pick prices in a range from 1 to 30, where prices are complements. A matrix is shown to players and denotes *nominal* payoffs dependent on their own price and the average price chosen by 3 other players. Players are asked to divide these payoffs by the total average price to determine the actual (real) payoffs. The existence of such a matrix implies that the players have full information on the pricing function. Still, the presentation in form of a matrix without a given functional form complicates the reasoning process. Prices are set again as complements. The game has a unique, dominance-solvable equilibrium. After players had time to learn the equilibrium, which happened quite fast, they were confronted with a shock. The money supply shrank and a matrix with new payoffs was delivered to the players. About 20% of the players chose prices above the equilibrium, insufficiently adjusting their price. Even in subsequent rounds prices remained slightly too high. This implies a short-run non-neutrality of money. Interestingly, the effect is almost absent when agents played against computers or

when the matrix denoted real rather than nominal payoffs. In Fehr and Tyran (2008) the authors observe that adjustment is instantaneous when prices are substitutes rather than complements. This particularity is also found by Sutan and Willinger (2009) in a one-shot price guessing game also known as beauty contest. Again under full information subjects are closer to equilibrium in a complementary environment.

Laboratory beauty contests are closely related to pricing models and have been employed to investigate the cognition of reasoning processes. Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) report the results from such a laboratory guessing game. In this experiment subjects are asked to pick a number between 0 and 100. The player whose number is closest to p ($0<p<1$) times the average of all numbers chosen wins a fixed prize while all other players earn nothing. The iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies implies that only 0 survives as the equilibrium number. However, subjects substantially deviate from this equilibrium point. Average numbers are usually between 20 and 30 for $p=2/3$ and distributions of number choices show prominent spikes at 33 and 22. In order to explain these findings, both studies propose some boundedly rational refinements to the process of iterated application of dominance: First, "level-0" players are defined to randomly select numbers between 0 and 100, the average value being 50. This value then serves as a focal point for more sophisticated players. "Level-1" players best respond to "level-0" players, thus choosing 33. "Level-k" players best respond to the assumption that all others are "level-(k-1)" players. With these adjustments, participants are found to obey two to three steps of iterated dominance rather than an infinite number (Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt 1998).

When being played repeatedly, in higher rounds "level-0" players stop picking randomly, but utilize the previous round's average number instead. This implies that repeated play generates convergence towards equilibrium. But this convergence can be particularly slow and strongly dependent on how the game is framed, (Ho, Camerer and Weigelt 1998: 950; Duffy and Nagel 1997: 1699).

We believe that subjects are limited in their capacity to set equilibrium prices, and thereby inflation, either because they have limited computational skills or because they do not belief that other subjects can calculate equilibrium prices. Rather than sticky prices or sticky information we would have another reason for a departure from equilibrium. We call this sticky reasoning. For our experiment we prefer models with complete information. Departure from equilibrium in LtFEs may arise when the true model has not yet been detected and an efficient rule for forecasting prices has not yet been found. Information that allows detection of the true model arrives "sticky" across time. In order to isolate the effects of sticky reasoning from this adaptive learning process we focus on a design with full information.

Our experiment is close to those by Fehr and Tyran[1] and almost as simple as the above mentioned guessing games. But we let subjects set prices for many rounds and confront them with non-stationary shocks. To the best of our knowledge, while non-stationary data are standard to macroeconometrics they represent a novelty in experimental macroeconomics. A non-stationary shock is cognitively demanding to subjects and allows us to observe how it impacts on the preference for simple rules rather optimization.

[1] While Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2008) employ a complex payoff matrix, we provide subjects with the pricing function in order to facilitate the reasoning process.

We did not want to assume our subjects to take the role of econometricians, which might not match their layman experience and thus impair the external validity of the findings. We preferred to set up a model with heterogeneous prices where players assume the role of producers that set prices for their products, and thus determine levels of inflation for their individual product, rather than estimating how heterogeneous forecasts may translate into a (future) homogeneous market price. This difference was more important for the framing of the subjects' task and had a minor impact on the experimental design.

Our preference for a price-setting rather than a forecasting experiment was motivated by a more fundamental concern. The NKPC assumes subjects to forecast future prices. But would boundedly rational subjects choose this functional form? The current LtFEs take this for granted and employ subjects only for investigating the quantitative characteristics of their play. But would subjects by themselves opt to apply a forward looking behavior? Is the theoretical assumption that sticky prices induce forecasting supported by evidence? Or would we observe subjects to abstain from forecasting and prefer to follow other types of heuristics?

4 Experimental Design

Sticky reasoning comes along with a series of conjectures for pricing behavior in the laboratory. First, players will base their price less on rational calculation but on history. Failure to iteratively delete all (weakly) dominated strategies results in price adjustments being incomplete, just as numbers in guessing games, and history will remain important. This is likely to be particularly the case when players are confronted with (non-stationary) news. Second, simple usage of current information may imply excess or moderated volatility. Limited steps of reasoning imply a failure to achieve equilibrium levels of volatility. Third, when offering a simple but costly pricing rule we expect the majority of the players to prefer this heuristic as coordination device rather than using past prices. Fourth, we do not belief that there is a sufficient amount of higher-level players to validate the NKPC. Instead, we expect future levels of inflation to be irrelevant for actual price setting behavior.

In order to test our hypothesis we designed three treatments. With respect to the robustness of the results, each experimental design had to fulfill the following conditions:

1. Prices should be complements, which is standard for heterogeneous markets with Bertrand competition and appears to be adequate for macroeconomic environments, where prices across the supply chain positively impact each other.
2. Issues of fairness or cooperation should not overshadow the subject's calculus. While such issues loom large in reality and have been widely researched in their impact on pricing behavior,[2] we want to identify the reasons why subjects may depart from an individual optimum that they want to achieve. Our focus is thus on non-standard expectations such as limited reasoning rather than non-standard preferences.
3. The game should exhibit an unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The reason is that price levels should not vary by players switching between different expected equilibria.

[2] Potters and Suetens (2009), for example, find that cooperation is easier when actions are strategic complements, as is commonly assumed for prices in Bertrand games. Cooperation is less pronounced when actions are strategic substitutes, which is the standard assumption for quantity competition in Cournot games.

In each treatment, subjects play 30 rounds *t* of a pricing game in groups of six players. Each player is confronted with the task of determining an individual price, which is affected by a business indicator *BI*. The payoff function Π in each round *t* for subject *i* is defined as:

$$\Pi_{it} = 10 - \left| p_{it} - \hat{p}_t \right| \text{ , with } \hat{p}_t = 4/5 \cdot \left(p_{mt} + 5 \right) + BI_t /10 \text{ and } p_{mt} = 1/6 \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{6} p_{it} \qquad (1)$$

Each player, *i*, is assigned the role of a producer who must determine a price level p_{it} ranging between 0 and 100 for his product in round *t*. Each player receives 10 Taler as an endowment for each round. The endowment is reduced by the amount by which the chosen price p_{it}, differs from its target value $\hat{p}_t$. We denote the average price chosen by all six players (including player *i*) by p_{mt}. The intuitive motivation for this interaction scheme is explained to result from other players' products entering the production as an intermediary good. Also a raw material must additionally be bought for 5 Taler, justifying the respective value in brackets. The last term captures the impact of the business indicator *BI* on the payoff function. High values of *BI* indicate a high target value for prices; low values signal a low target value. As a treatment variable we will change the announcement of *BI*, which is discussed later.

What kind of equilibrium play is unraveled by iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies in our pricing game? Suppose, at a business indicator of BI_t=100 player *i* assumes all other players in his group to set prices in a way that $p_{mt} = 100$. By setting a price equal to the other players' prices player *i* would earn $\Pi_{it} = 10 - \left| 100 - 4/5 \cdot \left(100 + 5 \right) - 100/10 \right|$ or $\Pi_{it} = 10 - \left| 100 - 94 \right| = 4$ Taler. This leaves room for improvement. Rather than asking for a price of 100 Taler, player *i* should set out to maximize his payoffs at p_{it} =94 yielding a payoff of 10 Taler. However, assuming that all other players also behave in such a manner the average price p_{mt} will decrease to 94. Now, eliminating weakly dominated strategies will result in setting p_{it} =89.2 Taler. Again, all players will adjust their prices so that the new optimal price will fall to 85.4 Taler. Similar to the beauty contest, the race to the bottom only ends once there is no incentive to deviate from average prices for any player. Assuming a business indicator of *BI*=100 yields a dominance solvable unique Nash equilibrium at $p_{it} = p_{mt}$ = 70 (assumption 3). More generally, the equilibrium price p_t^* must satisfy $p_t^* = 4/5 \cdot \left(p_t^* + 5 \right) + BI_t /10$, which implies $p_t^* = 20 + BI_t / 2$. Rational play results in setting a price equal to 0.5 times the business indicator plus 20. Past levels of inflation are insignificant.

Figure 1 depicts player *i*'s best response function[3] given various levels of other players' prices for *BI*=100. In this example, players will also observe that their own price increases in the mean price (which, as an aside, is dependent on their own choice of the price). This reveals that prices are complements, as required by assumption 1. Players may reach this conclusion more easily by assuming that the mean price is exogenous and observing that it positively impacts their own optimum price, an assumption that is not excessively wrong.

[3] The response function is given by $p_{it} = 10/13 \, p_{-it} + \left(120 + 3BI_t \right)/26$, where p_{-it} denotes the price set by all players other than player *i*.



Figure 1: Reaction Function for Optimal Prices with BI_t=100

What about the second assumption? May issues of fairness be salient among players? With BI_t=100 player 1 may, for example, fear that all others choose a price that is too low, say p_{2t}=…=p_{6t}=45. If he also chooses p_{1t}=45, costs would amount to 5. He observes that his own optimal price would be p_{it}=50. By picking this price the mean price increases to p_{mt}=46, imposing an additional cost of 1 onto his colleagues. May the player abstain from setting p_i=50 due to a concern for equity or fairness?

This is unlikely due to two reasons. First, concern for others has often been found among pairs of players but less so in a group of people, where competitive pressure may be strong (e.g. Roth et al. 1991). Additionally, the player would have to bear costs of 5 in exchange for increasing the payoff of the other five players by 1. If we assume a player to care more about own than about other payoffs, fairness is unlikely to influence behavioral patterns. See Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998: 949) for similar assumptions related to guessing games.

Definitely, price setting in reality is more difficult than in this experiment as we abstained from e.g. designing heterogeneous competitors or incomplete information. However, we believe that the experimental design, and in particular the payoff function, are sufficiently simple so as to let subjects understand how their own payoff is determined dependent on their own play, that of others and exogenous variables. Moreover, all subjects are informed that others in the group face an identical pricing function, suggesting that subjects may also understand other player's calculus. Moreover, payoffs in each round do not depend on those in other rounds, disconnecting rational play from inter-temporal considerations. Nonetheless, we expect subjects to deviate from equilibrium prices because of sticky reasoning. Subjects are expected to fail in determining equilibrium prices or to expect such a failure from others.

5 Treatments

Our *BI* is given by a non-stationary data series. To be more precise, the data generating process was a random walk of the type BI_0= 50 and $BI_t = BI_{t-1}+\eta_t$, with η_t being drawn from integers [-15;15]. We generated different versions of this time series and chose the one where all values for BI_t were between 0 and 100 and where an ADF-test, $\Delta BI_t = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 BI_{t-1} - \gamma_3 \Delta BI_{t-1} + \nu_t$, produced insignificant coefficients γ_2 and γ_3 close to

zero. This made sure that the process did not, by random selection, turn out to be stationary or characterized by serial correlation. While some real world business indicators tend to be stationary, others such as stock price indicators are non-stationary. We preferred the latter so as to confront players with some news while playing the game. While the dynamics of the business indicator was thus more demanding, players should understand that the dynamics of the first two treatments is simple: each round is played independently with no dynamics, apart from cognitive ones, by which the play in one round may impact the other.

In the first two treatments we vary the way the business indicator is announced. In a first treatment, the business indicator, *BI* is reported to subjects as $\underline{BI}_t = BI_t / 5$, thus ranging between 0 and 20 and reported with one digit of precision In order to yield the same equilibrium in both treatments the target price $\hat{p}_t$ in equation (1) was given in the instructions as $\hat{p}_t = 4/5 \cdot (p_{mt} + 5) + \underline{BI}_t / 2$. This business indicator does not offer a simple method for coordinating prices. Its range and level of precision differ from those for prices. As shown in figure 2, $\underline{BI}$ also differs in value considerably from equilibrium prices. This implies that subjects find little reason to employ $\underline{BI}$, for example, for a simple one-to-one heuristic.



Figure 2: Business Indicator and equilibrium price

In a second treatment the business indicator was announced differently. Subjects were given the pricing function in equation (1) and the values of the business indicator as $\overline{BI}_t = BI_t$. As shown in figure 2, $\overline{BI}$ tends to be close to the equilibrium price. It also ranges between 0 and 100 and is reported in whole numbers. It thus reveals similarities to the range and precision of prices that subjects must set. For these reasons the business indicator may serve as a

coordinating device, a heuristic where prices are equated with the business indicator, $p_{it}= \overline{BI}_t$. Our second treatment tests how such a heuristic impacts prices.

Observe that the differences in the two treatments involve a mathematically meaningless transformation without an impact on the equilibrium price p_t^*. The values of the business indicator $\overline{BI}$ may be chosen as heuristic for level-0 play. Setting $p_{it}= \overline{BI}_t$ is a simple rule that is not too wrong. Such a rule may be attractive for two reasons. First, players may be confronted with computational limitations and a simple rule allows them to economize on their cognitive efforts. Second, they may think that other players are confronted with limited computational capacities and take the heuristic as a starting point for their own computation. This kind of anchor facilitates the reasoning process.

If $\overline{BI}_t$ =60, for example, the $\overline{BI}$-heuristic applied by all players, $p_{1t}= p_{2t}= p_{3t}= p_{4t}= p_{5t}= p_{6t}$=60, implies costs of 2. Assuming all other players to set prices in line with the $\overline{BI}$-heuristic, a more sophisticated player will abstain from choosing the equilibrium price of 50. Observing that other players stick to the heuristic she will prefer only a moderate decrease in her price by 2. Such a player would believe that she is the only one to decrease her price while others hold their prices constant (level-0 players). She may also believe that others increase the price by 2 (level-1 players) and have reason to further slightly decrease the price. But these iterative steps of reasoning are likely to be limited. The adjustment towards the Nash equilibrium, which would be 50, is likely to be incomplete. Sticky reasoning does not imply that price adjustments are necessarily smaller than equilibrium adjustments. If the heuristics employed generates excess volatility of prices, sticky reasoning will disallow a complete adjustment towards equilibrium prices and imply that some of this excess volatility remains.

Our third treatment resembles the staggered pricing model proposed by Taylor (1980). Again, players face the payoff function that includes the heuristic $\overline{BI}$. However, price setters are now limited in their capacity to adjust prices. The first 14 rounds were designed identically to the second treatment with heuristic. This made sure that players have a substantial understanding of the game. Then, for the subsequent 15 round a staggered pricing scheme was implemented: In round 15 all six players in a group were allowed to adjust prices. In round 16 only three players were allowed to adjust prices, while prices for the other three players were taken from round 15. In all subsequent rounds the capacity to adjust prices switched, being granted to those who previously could not adjust. E.g. in round 17, the other three players were allowed to adjust their prices, while the first three would play with their price level set in the previous round. This alternating procedure continued until round 30, where again all players were allowed to adjust their prices.

How would fully rational players behave in round *t* when they are allowed to adjust but know that they are impeded to do so in the subsequent round? We determine equilibrium prices following Taylor (1980). Players know all past and future levels for the business indicator such that equilibrium prices could be determined. We denote the average price level of those adjusting in round *t* by p_{xt} and that of other players who adjust in *t-1* by $p_{x(t-1)}$. Since fully rational players are predicted to play identical strategies the mean price is the average of the price currently set by three players and the one set by the other three players in the previous round, $p_{mt} = 1/2(p_{xt} + p_{x(t-1)})$. Players observe that their price must maximize the payoff in two rounds, *t* and in *t+1*. Since the payoff function is linear in all prices and identical for both

rounds, any price can be taken between the optimal price in *t* and the one that is optimal in *t+1*. A feasible approach is to take a target value $\hat{p}_{xt}$ midway between the two prices:

$$\hat{p}_{xt} = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{4}{5}(p_{mt}+5)+\frac{BI_t}{10}\right)+\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{4}{5}(p_{m(t+1)}+5)+\frac{BI_{t+1}}{10}\right) \qquad (3)$$

Inserting for p_{mt} we obtain:

$$\hat{p}_{xt} = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{4}{5}\left[\frac{1}{2}(p_{xt}+p_{x(t-1)})+5\right]+\frac{BI_t}{10}\right)+\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{4}{5}\left[\frac{1}{2}(p_{x(t+1)}+p_{xt})+5\right]+\frac{BI_{t+1}}{10}\right)$$

Rationality implies $\hat{p}_{xt} = p_{xt}$ and we obtain:

$$p_{xt} = \frac{p_{xt}+p_{x(t-1)}}{5}+\frac{p_{x(t+1)}+p_{xt}}{5}+4+\frac{BI_t+BI_{t+1}}{20} \Leftrightarrow$$

$$p_{xt} = \frac{1}{3}\cdot\left(p_{x(t-1)}+p_{x(t+1)}+20+\frac{BI_t+BI_{t+1}}{4}\right) \qquad (4)^4$$

Optimal rates of inflation are not trivial to determine. Prices in round 30 are flexible, their equilibrium value being 64.5 (disregarding here that whole numbers must be chosen). Using equation (4) allows determining prices in rounds 15-29 by backward induction. But also past prices enter the current calculus, for which predetermined values must be assumed. For a first round of iterations we chose flexible prices and substituted these by the values obtained in the last iteration. After 8 iterations changes were smaller than 0.01, suggesting a fair amount of convergence. The first differences of these values are plotted in figure 3. In equilibrium play we observe price volatility to be dampened considerably, due to future and past prices being relevant for current pricing decision. However, given the complexity of this treatment, we expect subjects to significantly deviate from the equilibrium prediction. As implied by sticky reasoning, subjects may be rather limited in their forward-looking capacities disregarding future rates of inflation.

[4] This can also be rewritten as $p_{xt}+(p_{xt}-p_{x(t-1)})=(p_{x(t+1)}+p_{xt})+20+BI_t/4+BI_{t+1}/4$. Please observe that this equation differs from the one commonly found for staggered pricing, (Taylor 1980; Romer 2006: 332). In their approach only relative prices have an impact on payoffs, suggesting that the mean price impacts a player's own price with a partial derivative of 1. We included also a fixed price for raw materials and the mean price to impact with a partial derivative of 4/5. This is the reason why the left hand side of the equation includes not only current inflation among price-setters, $p_{xt}+p_{x(t-1)}$, but also the current price, p_{xt}.



Figure 1: Optimal Inflation with Staggered and Flexible Prices

6 Experimental Procedures

The experiment was conducted computer-based at the Passau University Experimental Laboratory (PAULA) using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The data for $\underline{BI}$ or respectively $\overline{BI}$ was common knowledge in all treatments because values for all 30 rounds were reported upfront (and everybody was told that values are reported to everybody upfront).

Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory and publicly instructed about the purpose of the game, its expected length, dos and don'ts and about (standard) payment and blindness procedures. In order to increase overall understanding of the rules, the first screens explained the game in a detailed manner using a step-by-step approach that was found to be perceived as intuitively appealing by pilot subjects (see figure 4 for an example). Questions by participants were not allowed at this stage.



Figure 4: Selected instructions – step 8 of 8 (English translation)

Each step presented was also accompanied by three examples and subjects were given the possibility to (re-)calculate each example. The first four rounds in each treatment were reserved for learning, thus payoffs in these rounds were hypothetical. These four rounds are separated in figures 1, 6, 7 and 9 by a vertical line. Actual payoffs were achieved in the following 26 rounds. 6 groups played the first treatment where the BI-heuristic was absent. Another 5 groups played the second treatment where this heuristic may be used as a coordinating device. 9 groups of players played the third treatment with a staggered pricing scheme. Thus, each subject participated in only one treatment (between-subjects design).

Throughout the entire experiment we provided feedback on all relevant information (see figure 5). At the end of the experiment, each subject received the sum of Talers earned at an exchange rate of 1 Taler = 5 Eurocent.



12th round

1: round	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
2: business indicator, BI	43	51	42	33	19	23	24	31	27	24	33	35	33	36	46	39	53	46	54	57	63	76	82	87	86	89
3: own price, P	22	25	30	15	11	12	12	17	17	18	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4: average price, PM	22	25	23	16	12	13	13	18	19	15	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5: endowment	10	10	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6: costs = |P-4/5*(PM+5)-BI/10|	3	4	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7: payoff	7	6	7	5	6	6	6	6	6	10	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8: total payoff	7	13	20	25	31	37	43	49	55	65	74	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure 5: Game sheet of 12th round from 26 played for pay (English translation)

7 Descriptive Results

The experiment was conducted in seven sessions of 12 to 18 students from the University of Passau over a one-week period in December 2010 and on May 30, 2011. In total, 120 subjects participated and formed 20 autonomous pricing groups. Subjects needed roughly 8 minutes to read the step-by-step instructions and (re-)calculate examples. Total payoffs to the 120 participants amounted to 1,181.70 €. Payoffs per person were 9.85 € on average and ranged between 13.30 € and 4.80 €. The game on average lasted for 75 minutes, suggesting an hourly income of 7.88 €. This is in line with hourly salaries for student assistants.

A first grasp of the results is presented in figures 6-8. All individual prices of the first treatment without heuristic are shown in figure 6. All individual prices in the second treatment that does offer the *BI*-heuristic are shown in figure 7. Figure 8 depicts the prices chosen in rounds 15-30 in the staggered treatment.



Figure 6: Individual Prices – Treatment without heuristic (treatment 1)



Figure 7: Individual Prices – Treatment with heuristic (treatment 2)



Figure 8: Change in Average Prices among Price Setters relative to Previous Round, Data for 9 Groups (treatment 3)

As figure 6 reveals, prices were quite volatile. This finding suggests that players may have experienced computational limitations. In that case, the higher variance may be explained by heterogeneous guessing schemes about the expected mean price of level-0 players. Figure 7 corroborates our conjecture. The simple $\overline{BI}$-heuristic has a strong impact on individual prices. Players were willing to follow this heuristic although this implied that prices depart from equilibrium prices. As can be observed from the figure, this departure occurred in the short and in the long run. In the short run changes in $\overline{BI}$ were translated one to one to changes in prices, even though equilibrium play would have suggested adjusting prices by half of the changes in $\overline{BI}$ Even in the long-run, prices do not converge towards the equilibrium price, as becomes particularly visible in rounds 25-30. Also in the staggered pricing treatment (figure 8), we fail to observe the dampening effect as predicted by Nash equilibrium play. Players' behavior again seems to be highly guided by the $\overline{BI}$-heuristic attesting further coordinative power to it even under staggered pricing limitations.

Figure 9 provides similar evidence. It reports the standard deviation in prices within groups as compared to the one between all individuals for treatments 1 and 2.



Figure 9: Standard deviations – within groups and across all observations

In line with figures 6-7, the standard deviation across all observations is largest where the heuristic is absent. However, the standard deviation among players within the same group is rather low. This implies that the large standard deviation is due to prices differing considerably from one group to another, rather than within groups. The heuristic is capable of causing different group's prices to converge but also to reduce deviation across all observations. The first rounds are characterized by heterogeneity, in particular during the first 4 rounds that were reserved for learning. Afterwards, the standard deviation among prices remains rather stable. Figure 9 thus provides no indication of learning effects during rounds 5-29.

8 Regression Analysis

Treatment with and without heuristic

We focus on average group prices p_{mt} for regression analysis and start by analyzing the simple long-run relationship between prices and *BI*. To allow for comparison we regress on *BI* rather than on $\overline{BI}$ or $\underline{BI}$.

$$p_{mt} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 BI_t + \varepsilon_t \qquad (5)$$

Method: Ordinary Least Squares.[a)]			
Dependent Variable	Average Group Price, p_{mt}	Average Group Price, p_{mt}	Average Price among Price Setters, p_{xt}
Independent Variable	1. Treatment without Heuristic	2. Treatment with Heuristic	3. Treatment, Staggered Pricing
β_1 Constant	7.39	1.19	4.85
	(5.0)	(1.9)	(6.4)
β_2 Business Indicator, BI_t	0.81	0.94	0.52
	(28.4)	(76.4)	(11.9)
β_3 Lagged Price $p_{x(t-1)}$			0.41
			(8.3)
Rounds	5-30	5-30	15-30
Total Obs.	156	130	144
ADF on Residuals	-3.22	-3.44	-4.26
R^2	0.84	0.98	0.97

a) t-statistics in parenthesis.

Table 1: Time Series Regressions for Average Prices

We focus on the first two treatments and will interpret the third treatment later. Throughout the regressions in table 1 BI_t obtains the expected sign. We carry out an ADF-test on the residuals, ε_t, of the type $\Delta\varepsilon_t = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2\varepsilon_{t-1} - \gamma_3\Delta\varepsilon_{t-1} + \nu_t$ and report the t-statistics for the coefficient γ_2. The critical McKinnon values are -3.48 (1% error level) and -2.88 (5% error level). In the first two treatments the t-statistics are smaller than the critical value at the 5% level, allowing us to infer that residuals have a unit root and both regressions depict a cointegrating relationship. A note of caution is required. With only 26 observations per group convergence is not very strong and error levels may be measured with some imprecision. The time series properties are not very strong for tests on cointegration. Still, the results allow us to proceed by assuming a cointegrating relationship and capture the dynamic structure by help of an error-correction approach:

$$\Delta p_{mt} = \phi_0 \Delta BI_t + \phi_1 (p_{m(t-1)} - \beta_1 - \beta_2 BI_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_t \qquad (6)$$

The last term depicts the long-run relationship from table 1, which is tested simultaneously with the short-term dynamics. Departures from the long-run relationship are denoted as an "error", which groups of players seek to compensate by increasing or decreasing the average price. Coefficient ϕ_1 denotes the speed of adjustment with $\phi_1 = 1$ indicating immediate adjustment towards the long-run relationship and lower values denoting a more sluggish reaction. The coefficient ϕ_1 is not normally distributed; the critical values by McKinnon must again be applied.

As can be observed from table 2, regression 1 for the first treatment with $\underline{BI}$, values are quite in line with equilibrium values. The long-term constant, $\beta_1 = 18.08$ is close to its predicted value of 20, and, as confirmed by a Wald-test, does not differ significantly from this value. A Wald-test on coefficients also confirms that the long-term influence of *BI*, as denoted by the

coefficient $\beta_2 = 0.60$, does not significantly differ from 0.5. We can thus comfortably argue that prices do not significantly depart from their equilibrium values.

But we observe that changes in *BI*, as denoted by coefficient $\phi_0 = 0.79$, exert an excessively large impact. Players overinfer from changes in *BI* to the choice of the current price. This finding may replicate what has been labeled an extrapolation bias. In a variety of games subjects have been found to overinfer from current, visible data at the expense of other more rational considerations. For a review see Fuster, Laibson and Mendel (2010). We also observe that adjustment is rather slow. With an error term $\phi_1 = 0.19$ less than 20 percent of past errors are corrected in current rounds. This error term, still, is highly significant with a t-statistics well beyond the 1-percent critical MacKinnon value of 3.46. The long-term relationship between the average price and the business indicator is thus a cointegrating relationship.

When the heuristic is available the coefficient ϕ_1 is higher. This implies that the heuristic helps in achieving a quicker convergence. But the resulting relationship is not the equilibrium relationship. The constant is smaller than the equilibrium value of 20. The long-term impact of *BI* is larger than the 0.50 that equilibrium play implied and close to the value expected from the heuristic. Applying a Wald-test on coefficients reveals that their difference relative to equilibrium values is significant at the 1% error level. The same is true of the short-term dynamic. Changes of BI impact prices with a coefficient of 0.92, which is more than the 0.5 predicted from equilibrium play. Thus, the extrapolation bias is even more pronounced in the second treatment.

Dependent Variable: Change in Average Group Price, Δp_{mt} Method: Ordinary Least Squares Error Correction Model.[a)]		
Independent Variable	1. Treatment without Heuristic	2. Treatment with Heuristic
ϕ_0 Change in BI, ΔBI_t	0.79	0.92
	(17.0)	(28.9)
ϕ_1 Error Term	-0.19	-0.58
	(-4.0)	(-8.1)
β_1 Long-Term Constant	18.08	1.28
	(3.2)	(1.2)
β_2 Long-Term BI_{t-1}	0.60	0.94
	(5.3)	(42.2)
Rounds	6-30	6-30
Total Obs.	150	125
R^2	0.67	0.87

a) t-statistics in parenthesis.

Table 2: Error Correction Regressions for Average Prices

Staggered treatment with heuristic

The optimal staggered pricing requires a high level of reasoning. Limited reasoning capacities may encourage "level-0" players to follow the *BI*-heuristic. In that case, "level-1" players will observe that the price they set must also fit for the next round. For this reason they will recognize the next round's value for the business indicator, BI_{t+1}. But will they recognize that players in the next round look one round ahead also? This would be a "level-2"-type of

behavior, where the two round-ahead business indicator becomes relevant. Complete rationality implies that the next round's level of inflation becomes relevant. But will players recognize that $p_{x(t+1)}$ should enter their calculus? Subjects will face computational limitations in carrying out these higher levels of reasoning. And even if they are able to compute higher orders of reasoning they may believe other players are incapable of doing so and thus prefer to stick to a simpler calculation.

Our regressions in the third treatment focus again on average group prices. This time the average is taken across all players who are free to adjust their price level, p_{xt}. With 9 pricing groups in the third treatment and 15 rounds we obtain 135 observations. We start by testing, first, whether a long-term relationship exists.[5] Players will recognize that prices set in the previous round cannot be changed and should thus have an impact on current prices. Thus we modify the long-run relationship to include lagged prices We estimated equation (7).

$$p_{xt} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 BI_t + \beta_3 p_{x(t-1)} + \varepsilon_t \qquad (7)$$

Findings are reported as regression 3 in table 1. The corresponding ADF-test reveals a t-statistic of -4.26 for past residuals, showing that regression 3 is a cointegrating relationship at a 1% error level. We can thus employ it as the long-term relationship in an error-correction model. The simple test equation is thus

$$\Delta p_{xt} = \phi_0 \Delta BI_t + \phi_1 (p_{x(t-1)} - \beta_1 - \beta_2 BI_{t-1} - \beta_3 p_{x(t-2)}) + \varepsilon_t \qquad (8)$$

As can be seen from regression 1, table 3, the coefficients are similar to the ones obtained in the second treatment with the heuristic. The error term is significant at a 1% error level. But this specification leaves out two important variables, identified in equation (4). We observe that the future level of *BI* is relevant, as well as the future price level. Given the error-correction approach we thus include first differences for both variables, ΔBI_{t+1} and $\Delta p_{x(t+1)}$. We do not include changes in past prices, because this variable is captured already in the long-term relationship.

As shown in regression 2, table 3, only the business indicator obtains the expected sign. Future inflation does not positively impact current prices. To the contrary, the impact of future inflation is negative and even significant. Players take the next round's business indicator into consideration. But they fail in carrying out another step of iterative reasoning, observing that their price should rise with that of players in the next round. In how far players anticipate future events can also be tested by checking the two round ahead business indicator ΔBI_{t+2}. As shown in regression 3, table 3, this variable is insignificant. Reasoning in our pricing game is limited to "level-1".

[5] Owing to the fact that *BI* is non-stationary we cannot directly test equation (4). We also cannot test first differences of equation (4) because this would miss a cointegrating term, forcing inflation to respond to deviations from a long-term relationship.

Dependent Variable: Change in Average Price among Price Setters, Δp_{xt} Method: Ordinary Least Squares Error Correction Model.[a)]				
Independent Variable	1. Staggered Treatment	2. Staggered Treatment	3. Staggered Treatment	4. Staggered Treatment
ϕ_0 Change in Business Indicator, ΔBI_t	0.53 (10.4)	0.67 (17.9)	0.63 (13.7)	0.64 (13.7)
ϕ_1 Error Term	-0.33 (-4.1)	-0.34 (-4.8)	-0.52 (-6.3)	-0.49 (-6.1)
β_1 Long-Term Constant	9.3 (3.5)	6.87 (2.9)	-0.13 (-0.1)	0.87 (0.4)
β_2 Long-Term BI_{t-1}	0.47 (3.3)	0.54 (4.8)	0.45 (5.3)	0.46 (5.1)
β_3 Long-Term Lagged Price $p_{x(t-2)}$	0.47 (2.8)	0.37 (2.7)	0.58 (5.3)	0.57 (4.8)
ϕ_2 Change in Future Business Indicator, ΔBI_{t+1}		0.44 (9.4)	0.28 (6.5)	0.25 (6.2)
ϕ_3 Change in Future Price $\Delta p_{x(t+1)}$		-0.35 (-5.0)		
ϕ_4 Change in Future Business Indicator ΔBI_{t+2}			0.06 (1.5)	
ϕ_5 Change in Future Price $\Delta_2 p_{x(t+2)}$				0.01 (0.1)
Rounds	16-30	16-29	16-28	16-28
Total Obs.	126	117	108	108
R^2	0.64	0.81	0.77	0.77

a) t-statistics in parenthesis.

Table 3: Time Series Regressions for Staggered Prices

We tested various hypotheses that may account for ϕ_3 obtaining the wrong sign. One idea would be that some players consistently set their price excessively high while others set their price continuously too low. This heterogeneity among players would induce pricing in the staggered treatment to follow an alternating development. Regression 4 thus includes an explanatory variable on future price changes that arise across two periods $\Delta_2 p_{x(t+2)}$. The resulting coefficient ϕ_5 is close to zero and insignificant. This may indeed hint at the described heterogeneity among players. At the same time it corroborates insignificance of expectations with respect to future prices.

Overall we observe ample support for sticky reasoning. Players seem to follow the business indicator, *BI*, that provides them with a fast and frugal way of setting prices. They take into account only the next round's level of *BI*, thus recognizing that their current price should also operate well in the next round when they are unable to adjust their price. But they fail to carry out further steps of reasoning such that future inflation would be recognized. Sticky reasoning is responsible for history dependent play, excess volatility, coordination on imperfect heuristics, and future inflation failing to obtain the expected, significant impact. Limits to

reasoning imply a preference for heuristics rather than forward looking behavior as a driver of inflation dynamics.

9 Conclusions and Outlook

Price-setting in a non-stationary world is cognitively demanding such that a heuristic, if available, is preferred to optimizing. Such a heuristic is powerful in coordinating price-setting and driving away prices from their equilibrium path. Contrary to Akerlof et al. (2000) we observe that such a heuristic does not bias decisions towards the status quo. Instead, it can generate excess volatility by overinference.

Contrary to theoretical predictions we also observe that forward looking behavior, which is optimal an in staggered-pricing environment, is insignificant. In this complex environment, subjects are observed to apply only one step of iterative reasoning, thus recognizing only the next round's business indicator but not future inflation.

Our results bring about some policy recommendations. First, monetary policy may be confronted with longer time lags, but these do not just refer to prices being sticky and price adjustment biased towards the status quo but also to heuristics driving prices away from their equilibrium values. Second, the costs of disinflation and the resulting sacrifice ratios depend on whether heuristics are at play. Research has mostly focused on anchoring rational player's inflation expectations, for example by help of improved central bank credibility. A focus on heuristics may help better address the behavior of players with limited reasoning capacities. Third, evidence has been gathered that the costs of achieving price stability do not markedly increase when hyperinflation rather than high inflation prevailed. Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) relate this to the absence of nominal rigidities in a hyperinflationary environment. Heuristics provide another approach to this finding. Price stability may require a heuristic where price signals are credibility anchored. Such a task may be equally demanding, irrespective of whether hyperinflation or high inflation prevailed. Fourth, observing how firms set their prices, what signals they observe and who controls and designs these signals may be important in order to fully understand the conditions for price stability.

Our findings also open avenues for future research. What are the real world cases of signals that serve as heuristics, such as explicit and implicit indexation rules or softer signals such as official announcements or media coverage, and how are they communicated? May players abandon one heuristic and shift to another? In how far can heuristics be the target of policy? May different heuristics survive within a currency union, distorting relative prices? How may dynamics develop when sticky information is added to the model? While our model has broken new ground, we contend that much remains to be done to fully understand the actor's cognitive mind map and the resulting policy implications.

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