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Title:Beyond condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records PDF Logo
Authors:Baharad, Eyal
Goldberger, Jacob
Koppel, Moshe
Nitzan, Shmuel
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3323
Abstract:The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.
JEL:D70
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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