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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40660
  
Title:Learning form experts PDF Logo
Authors:Valsecchi, Irene
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: IEM, International energy markets 2008,35
Abstract:The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert's performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert's substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected.
Subjects:Expert
Information Transmission
Learning
JEL:D81
L21
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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