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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2008,35
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert's performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert's substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected.
Schlagwörter: 
Expert
Information Transmission
Learning
JEL: 
D81
L21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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