Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27731 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2009-33
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
The authors examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R&D stopping game, where they allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product market. They observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms' abilities as researchers change. Further, the authors observe differences in the social optimality of entry patterns depending on the underlying research abilities of the firms. Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements can play a role in correcting these suboptimal patterns of entry. The authors find that increasing the novelty requirement does not necessarily increase either the profits or, consequently, the investment levels of the initial innovator, contrary to much of the cumulative innovation literature. When the research abilities of the firms differ, either the high ability firm or the low ability firm may be the first mover. Policy interventions have much more ambiguous welfare effects in this asymmetric case, as they can change the order of entry.
Schlagwörter: 
Innovation
minimum quality standards
novelty requirements
stopping game
JEL: 
L15
L16
O31
O33
O34
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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