Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18946
Authors: 
Verbon, Harrie A. A.
Withagen, Cees A.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1482
Abstract: 
A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.
Subjects: 
tradable permits
trade bans
fiscal federalism
JEL: 
H21
Q00
H23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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