Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98568 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 286-298
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
Subjects: 
coalition formation
farsighted players
stability
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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