Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98561
Authors: 
Berninghaus, Siegfried
Güth, Werner
Schosser, Stephan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 144-162
Abstract: 
In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.
Subjects: 
public good game
neighborhood
cooperation
experimental analysis
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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