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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 333-354
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
Schlagwörter: 
coordination
minority game
mixed strategy
learning models
experiments
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