Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98419
Authors: 
Beckmann, Klaus
Gattke, Susan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre 142
Abstract: 
We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the presence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement of the 'admissible' degree of tax evasion, which, in turn, they use to influence the probability of detection. Some potential policy conclusions and extensions are discussed.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
cognitive dissonance
public signals
JEL: 
H26
H30
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.