Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97245
Authors: 
Kuzmics, Christoph
Palfrey, Thomas
Rogers, Brian W.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1551
Abstract: 
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.
Subjects: 
symmetry
repeated games
focal points
experiments
symmetry
repeated games
focal points
experiments
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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